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Abstract
Software is not developed in a vacuum. Development
teams and organizations must react to various incidents,
such as changes in personnel, development practices,
project objectives, and business environment, and all
kinds of delays occurring during large-scale software
development projects. These incidents challenge
contemporary communication, collaboration and
development practices. They also require an ability to
adapt to the new situation. We argue that the problems
in reacting to those incidents and the inability in
implementing corrective actions are the main reasons
for software project failures. We identify four drivers of
collaboration. They are named as contract, individual
person, group of collaborators, and development
process, each being appropriate in different points of
time. Yet their emphasis and appropriateness vary over
time. This emphasizes the developers’ ability to transit
between the drivers of collaboration.
Keywords: information systems development, incidents,
collaboration, project management

1. Introduction
Contemporary software development takes place in
networks of people. Programmers, systems designers,
and other actors collaborate within and across teams and
organizations, often in global settings. To succeed, they
need to communicate, coordinate, and interact. Software
development is increasingly social.
Single software components and programs are
developed independently and integrated to serve
different groups of users and their needs as
comprehensively as possible. For example, enterprise
resource planning (ERP) systems are composed of
different “modules” or “components” for different
tasks, such as finance, supply chain, stocks, and
production management. Individual components and
programs form larger aggregates, which, due to their
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size, are often complex and time-consuming to develop.
As the components are integrated under the same user
interface and database, they look like a single system to
their users, but in reality, they are built as assemblages
from parts of larger infrastructural building blocks and
smaller sub systems, or tied through hooks and glue
code to platforms. The development of such large-scale
systems requires software development methods and
practices that handle both the scale and extensive length
of the project.
Large-scale software development is seldom
straightforward and easy. Not only the technical project
objectives but also non-technical circumstances, such as
the number of actors, tightness of schedules, and size
and length of the project make the development process
complex. The projects are plagued by unexpected
incidents, caused by the changes in the personnel,
development practices or project objectives, delays, or
external events, such as mergers and acquisitions or
significant changes in the company’s business
environment. In many cases changes to the platforms
that the software relies on to run can alter the course of
development. The success and outcome of long projects
is dependent on the ability to prepare, react, and recover
from these incidents.
Unexpected incidents initiate intentional or
unintentional changes to the project and its practices.
These changes easily disrupt software development as
they cause uncertainties and discontinuities, possibly
affecting the project objectives or customer
commitment. However, there is little research about the
project disruptions over time and their consequences
[1]. Most studies focus on short-term changes and
survival strategies [2, 3], not on prolonged projects and
evolving long-term relationships between the
stakeholders. Large volume of software engineering
research focuses on software processes, requirements,
or communication [1, 4], not on organizational effects
on the projects. These issues are emphasized in large
projects where changes are likely to happen. Although
similar large projects are studied for example in the
construction context, the abstractness and intangibility
of software development makes it difficult to apply the
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findings from other fields in the more intangible
software context.
As an example of large-scale software development,
many ERP projects still fail [5, 6] despite having been
studied extensively over the past thirty years. The
studies have mostly focused on success and failure
factors, short-term activities, and technical issues. We
take an alternative view. We focus on collaboration
practices between the software developers and their
customers in a large-scale ERP development project,
during which different incidents take place over
extended period of time. We try to understand why the
project failed despite several seemingly successful
attempts to recover from different incidents and crisis.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we will
present our research methods and the case description.
Second, we will summarize our findings and reflect
them to the literature. Finally, they are discussed in a
broader context so that conclusions can be made.

2. Methodology
This case study focuses on an ERP system renewal
project, taking place 2007-2014. We conducted 16
qualitative interviews in the large manufacturer
company (12 interviewees) and the smallish ERP
vendor (4 interviewees). The interviewees were from
customer IT (Corporate CIO, ICT manager, and three
technical persons), customer business (five managers
and two end-users), and vendor organization (CEO and
three developers), each having participated in the ERP
system renewal within the last few years. The
interviewees were selected by using snowball sampling,
i.e. each person recommended new interviewees [7]. We
asked each interviewee to tell their story about the
project, its progress and challenges from his/her
perspective. These stories, lasting about 49 minutes on
average, were audio recorded.
By inductively and iteratively analyzing the
qualitative stories [8, 9] it became evident that there
were four different drivers of collaboration, each
dominating in different points of time. This analysis was
initially done by the first author, and later collectively
discussed among all authors. Our findings will be
discussed next.

3. Case study
The customer organization manufactures consumer
products in Northern Europe. They have 4500
employees, with annual worldwide sales of 1400M€
(2016). Over the years, the company has grown by
mergers and acquisitions to more than 3000 sales offices
in 62 countries. In 2008, they identified a need to renew
their sales process and its systems support, namely ERP.

The customer organization (hereafter a customer) had a
joint history with their ERP provider, dating back to
1997. The vendor had developed and designed a tailored
ERP that had been in use ever since. Selecting a renewal
partner was thus based on a fact that “they knew our
processes already” (Customer CIO).
Our case story begins in 2008. The old ERP system
did not meet the customer’s needs and expectations, and
it was perceived as technologically outdated. The
customer and vendor mutually agreed on a renewal
project (hereafter the project). A contract was signed. It
defined the project objectives, used technologies, modes
of project collaboration – and the use of the old ERP as
a basis for requirements specification. This approach
turned out to be quite problematic. Customer IT support
articulated that “the specification that is done with the
vendor can be just email conversations” while the
vendor had similar experiences: “Customer has been
using the old version, and when the specifications were
fixed, many things have been left unspecified. Of
course, it has been assumed, by default, that they will be
the same as earlier' (Vendor Senior designer). No one
was pleased with the situation. It is worth noting here
that this is similar to the idea that one would use one
platform APIs and services as requirements for a new
platform. This can work in a pure transition from one
highly standardized platform to another, but not in a
renewal or major upgrade, or in a radical process
change.
Nevertheless, the contract, largely a standard
agreement between the parties, was signed. It was
written more like a memorandum of understanding
rather than a binding and limiting agreement. This loose
approach was perceived appropriate because of the
existing long-term partnership and practices. The
vendor started to develop a new system.
Then the global economy declined. The project was
halted for two years, until June 2010. But the company
growth did not stop. Its internationalization continued
with acquiring more sales offices around the world. This
meant a change in needs and requirements for the new
ERP. The old ERP lost its role as an example for
necessary functionality. To convey new needs and
requirements to the vendor, the customer assigned a
project manager to work closely with the vendor. This
changed the relationship between the organizations
profoundly. Instead of entering a time-consuming renegotiation about the contract, they continued the
project with a mutual understanding of what was the
target. The project was driven by the will to collaborate,
not by the formal contract.
Over the next two years, the project manager
developed a strong vision of what is ultimately needed.
Yet he perceived that “strategic and managerial
planning was challenging because the vendor was not

Page 5556

able to present a roadmap… (Phasing) was done as
hand-to-mouth (for the practical purpose in the IS
product development) …” Despite these difficulties, he
developed a vision and communicated it to the vendor
but did not check its congruence with the customer’s
strategy and vision well enough. The project
collaboration was not driven by the organizations, but
by the project manager personally.
The project manager was formally employed by the
customer. However, he was practically working in both
organizations, understanding their needs, capabilities,
and limitations. In February 2012, he was even
appointed to the vendor’s internal board of
management. Optimally this dual role could have
resulted in a perfect outcome. Practically, it turned out
to be a chaos.
The project manager, being intensively tied with the
project and with the vendor, had lost his touch to
business development activities in the customer. The
customer’s needs had significantly diverged and
changed over time since more and more sales offices
were acquired and the business processes had evolved.
The old ERP, the old vision, and even the new vision
based on those, had become inappropriate. This was
highlighted in December 2012, at the time of the first
roll-out, when the customer CIO postponed the roll-outs
because of immature ERP. The system was not yet ready
for use. The project manager resigned in January 2013.
A new project manager was hired from another
branch of industry, the highly regulated pharmacy. He
emphasized his experiences, old customs and software
development practices which he believed would help in
overcoming the problems. He thus started to steer the
project towards strict, defined and implemented
development processes and practices.
However, earlier software development practices
were nothing but defined. The customer IT manager
concretized this in terms of tracking the ideas: “Now we
have the practical problem that the ideas are forgotten.
We have a traditional challenge: (how to manage a
design process with changes), how to get a centralized
tracking of the ideas for advancing with these properly
(until the design and work tasks are incorporated into
the product development)”. Meanwhile different actors
collaborated without clear instructions and methods,
with persons they had earlier been collaborating,
answering the needs of those who request them the
most. This created contradictions when the formal
project manager tried to enforce the strictness of the
process. The others just continued their old ways of
working and undefined collaboration. The relationship
between the customer and the vendor was consequently
driven by both the process and the customary
collaboration practices. This contradiction resulted in

another chaos. After four months, a crisis meeting was
set to clean the air.
The customer’s CIO made an intervention, and
personally tried to steer the project back on track. As he
brags about having “tricks that all the other [vendor’s]
tasks will stop if we face that kind of [major] problem”,
he defined the practices, gave a carrot to the vendor to
deliver the ERP on time, and commanded the next rollout in early May (in three weeks) on five test sites. The
roll-out was successful in a sense that the system was
installed. However, it was still far from perfect as more
than 40 severe faults were identified. This resulted in a
situation, where “[the customer was] doing a lot of
testing (on behalf of) [the vendor]. We are identifying
the defects that they should already have found (in their
testing environment)” (Customer CIO).
The vendor continued fixing the bugs and
developing new features with their outsourcing partner,
and with the project manager acting as a boundary
spanner between the customer and the vendor. The
progress was minimal. The bugs remained, new features
were continuously expected and expectations failed, and
new roll-outs were postponed. Although the situation
annoyed both the customer and the vendor, there was
mutual understanding. In the words of the vendor
customer support: “There are still lots of customer
wishes about what they want. [They express] that they
want this and that, but we've gone a bit backwards, and
the customer understands it and agrees that we should
focus on fixing these”.
In early November, the CIO made another
intervention, and summoned another meeting with the
vendor. This time the contract was re-negotiated. It
explicitly defined what is needed and when – in early
January. As the timeline was very strict, the project
objectives were mitigated. This made the project tight
but realistic, which all agreed. The managers assumed
the contract would steer the project to a happy end.
But it didn’t. The contract neither defined the
collaboration practices unambiguously nor were they
clearly communicated. For example, Vendor Customer
support suggested that they “should have meetings at
short intervals. As our release cycle is two weeks, we
have to know what to plan for the next release, and what
are the most important points there.” Although the
project advanced significantly by the deadline, the
progress was not enough. There was still a significant
number of defects and missing features, even when
comparing to the old ERP. New features were still about
to come. Nevertheless, the vendor was happy with the
progress and was not concerned about these issues. They
believed the deadlines would be postponed again.
In early January, the customer CIO made a decision
to terminate the 18 years long cooperation with the
vendor. This was despite all others wanting to continue
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the relationship and get the system ready. The CIO had
lost his faith, and wanted to start from a blank slate, with
a new vendor or a system provider.

4. Findings from the case
The case illustrates that at different points of time,
the organization’s relationship was driven by different
factors: a contract, an individual person, free-form
collaboration practices, or a development process. They
are defined as follows:
• Contracts define roles and responsibilities, and
how different incidents are handled.
• Individual person can personally react to the
incidents and their consequences.
• Collaboration relies on mutual interests, voluntary
cooperation, and previous experiences. Incidents
and their consequences are solved by the
stakeholders’ common points of interests.
• Process determines the parties and procedures, and
how the incidents and their consequences are
resolved.
Table 1 illustrates the main project phases, incidents
and different drivers for the relationship.
Each driver in Table 1 has been found appropriate in
earlier literature. For example, Esteves & PastorCollado [10] identified the importance of an individual
person for the success of ERP projects. Similarly,
Saunders et al. [11] have emphasized contracts,
Kotlarsky & Oshri [12] smooth and flexible
collaboration and information exchange between the
stakeholders, and Fitzgerald et al. [13] appropriate
development process. It thus seems that the corrective

Time
2008
2008-10
June 2010
Feb 2012
Dec 2012
Jan 2013
April 2013
May 2013
Nov 2013
Jan 2014

actions to save the project were proven elsewhere. Why
did this project then fail?
Although there were several problems, such as poor
communication, undefined or ad hoc development
practices, or powerless management, they were not the
main sources of failures. Considering the timeline of the
project, from 2007 to 2014, five years with a break, is
long enough to make the corrective actions, and
implement them appropriately. Those actions were
made indeed. The problem was thus elsewhere, in their
implementation, and in the transitions from one action
and collaboration mode to the other.
The need to change the development and
collaboration practices were triggered by different
incidents. For example, when the old project manager
resigned, his dominant role and in-depth knowledge of
both the customer and the vendor could not be easily
replaced. This had both positive and negative effects.
The customer braced the project manager’s ability “to
emphasize the development priorities from our
perspective. I led the opinions when there was a decision
point… based on our expectations“ (Customer project
manager) and being informed about the vendor’s
problems, challenges, and directions. On the other hand,
the project manager “had things so well under control
because he has such a long history and he was involved
with developing the old system. Now the whole
initiative has not been under control in the same way
even though the IT team is very professional' (Vendor
Customer support). When the role disappeared, it
obligated significant changes in the other actors’
practices. They were not ready for the change and its
entailing practices, enforced by the new project
manager. The reaction to the incident failed. The

Table 1. Main phases of the project and collaboration drivers
Activities and incidents
Collaboration driver
Initiation
Contract
Project halted
Restart; Assigning a project manager Collaboration
Project manager appointed to the
Personally by the project manager
vendor’s board of management
Initial roll-out
Project manager resigns
New project manager enters
Defined development process
Crisis meeting because of conflicting Process and collaboration
collaboration drivers
CIO makes an intervention
Personally by CIO
Initial roll-out to 5 sites; numerous
Defined development process, influenced by ad-hoc
bugs
collaboration practices
CIO makes an intervention
Personally by CIO, continue by the contract
Termination of the contract
Personally by CIO
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problem was thus not the incident but the actors’
inability to react to it.
Large-scale software development projects are not
implemented in vacuum. All kinds of incidents are
possible and common; people may resign or sign in the
project, organizations and environments evidently
change, technologies advance, and development
methods and management isms are replaced. This
means that large-scale projects, potentially lasting
several years, will evidently face these incidents. To
cope with them is not easy and straightforward as our
case illustrates (see also [14]). Yet the research has not
paid attention to long-term relationships and their
evolution, despite the number of failures [5, 6]. This
ignorance could be one of the reasons why the
organizations do not learn from past mistakes. They are
not capable of reacting to incidents appropriately.

5. Conclusions
Our analysis revealed that the main reasons for the
project failure were collaboration breakdowns in the
transitions between the incidents. The incidents;
financial crisis, the board membership and resignation
of the project manager, roll-outs and materializing of the
defects, and CIO interventions all affected the software
development project. Meanwhile the developers at the
vendor side and the IT workforce at the customer side
continued their informal collaboration practices that had
been successful during the past 13+ years. The
implementation of corrective actions after the incidents
failed.
The implementation of a change in collaboration is
not easy in a hectic development project. Neves et al.
[14] addressed several characteristics that affect large
scale IT projects. They range from traditional project
management issues such as creeping requirements,
prolonged schedules and increasing costs to divergent
perspectives on IT project management and its
performance. Although we observed similar kind of
variety in the perspectives of project management
performance, we argue this disparity was not the source
of failure. Development practices and ways of
collaboration are often set at the beginning of the project
and defined by contracts. Yet, especially in large-scale
development projects, both external and internal
incidents will occur and influence the project. This
necessitates sensitivity to identify the incidents,
responsiveness to them, adaptability to new needs, and
ability to change the development practices as
appropriate. For example, the financial crisis made the
original contract and requirements specification
obsolete. The appointment of the project manager to the
board of managers overemphasized his role, which, to
be successful, would have necessitated new working

methods at the customer’s side. We argue that the
problems in reacting to different incidents and
implementing corrective actions are the main reasons
for collaboration breakdowns in software development.
In large-scale projects, instead of focusing on rigid
development practices or fine-tuning the contract, all
participating organizations should also concentrate on
evident incidents and how they are dealt with. This, in
turn, emphasizes the social side of development; how all
parties, at the customer side, at the vendor side, and at
other stakeholders, react and response to incidents and
corrective actions. The key to the success is on the
developers’ and other stakeholders’ ability to adapt and
change the driver of collaboration that may help in
avoiding collaboration breakdowns.
Somsen et al. [15] came to similar conclusions. They
emphasized the technological understanding and agility
in project management practices, whereas we argue that
the problem is not the technology but the ability to react
to different incidents, i.e. being agile in terms of
changing the collaboration driver. The importance of
managing complex relationships, of which the largescale software development projects necessitate, has
also been addressed (e.g. [16]). Yet again, the focus is
on a single driver, not on transition between the
collaboration drivers.
We consequently suggest two contributions. First,
we argue there is a need for new approaches to
understand the failures in IS projects. It seems that we,
as IS researchers, have studied the them from the
managerial point of view without understanding the
evident transitions between the managerial activities or
development practices. A need for studying the
dynamics and transitions in collaboration situations is
thus evident. Second, our small study provides a few
lessons. They can be formulated as follows:
• Prepare for evident incidents and react accordingly
sooner than later.
• Ensure that the corrective action is properly
implemented throughout the developer community
and monitor that the new collaboration driver is
respected and obeyed.
• Remember that the transitions between the drivers
of collaboration will not happen instantly but will
take time and face external pressures not to
change.
• Do not adhere the old collaboration driver
(contract, person, cooperation, process) too long as
the new situation, after the incident, most likely
requires new methods and modes of collaboration.
Recovering
from
different
collaboration
breakdowns are the keys to the success in large-scale
software development projects.
There are some limitations in this study. First, our
findings are based only on a single company and a single
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case. This means all possible drivers of collaboration
may have not been identified. However, we do not
consider this as a problem since we were more interested
in the transitions between the drivers. Second, although
we interviewed the key actors in the project at its later
stages, the interviews were retrospective. This means
the interviewees may not be able to recall all incidents
and activities that took place years before. However, we
were still able to construct the big picture and the
timeline of events. So, although some details may be
missing, collaboration drivers and the transitions were
unanimously confirmed by the interviewees.
Different incidents are indeed evident in large
development projects. Those projects range from ERP
renewal projects (as in this case) and large software
development projects to all kinds of platforms and their
development and integration. The foci of actions there
should not be only on narrow project management
practices but also on the agility to change the
collaboration practice, mode. The larger the project, the
more significant this becomes.
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